The Evolution of Common Law
The Evolution of Common Law
复制标题
普通法的演变
DOI：
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发表时间：
2007
影响因子：
8.2
通讯作者：
A. Shleifer
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
N. Gennaioli;A. Shleifer
我们提出了一个上诉法院的立法模式，在这个模式中，受政策偏好影响的法官可以以一定的代价区分判例。我们发现司法观点多样化的成本和收益。出于政策动机的法官扭曲了法律，使其偏离了效率，但司法观点的多样性也促进了法律的演变，提高了法律的精确性。我们把我们的核心发现称为卡多佐定理：即使法官是出于个人目的，平均而言，法律的进化也是有益的，因为它消除了司法偏见，使法律更加精确。本文为普通法的进化适应性提供了理论基础。
We present a model of lawmaking by appellate courts in which judges influenced by policy preferences can distinguish precedents at some cost. We find a cost and a benefit of diversity of judicial views. Policy‐motivated judges distort the law away from efficiency, but diversity of judicial views also fosters legal evolution and increases the law’s precision. We call our central finding the Cardozo theorem: even when judges are motivated by personal agendas, legal evolution is, on average, beneficial because it washes out judicial biases and renders the law more precise. Our paper provides a theoretical foundation for the evolutionary adaptability of common law.