The Customs Union Issue: Why Do We Observe so Few of Them?
The Customs Union Issue: Why Do We Observe so Few of Them?
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关税同盟问题：为什么我们观察到的关税同盟如此之少？
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.1400835
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发表时间：
2008
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Gerald Willmann
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
G. Facchini;Peri A. Silva;Gerald Willmann
优惠贸易协定的数量在过去二十年中大大增加，但大多数现有的双边安排采取自由贸易区的形式，只有不到10%的双边安排可以被认为是完全无边界的关税同盟。本文建立了一个不完全竞争条件下贸易政策的政治经济学模型，为自由贸易区的盛行提供了一个积极的解释。在三个国家的情况下，从每个潜在成员中选出一名代表，以确定对进口货物征收的关税。在关税同盟下，协调关税的必要性导致选民战略性地将权力下放给更具保护主义色彩的代表。与大多数现有文献相反，我们表明战略授权可能意味着自由贸易区比关税同盟增加福利。此外，该模型还表明，自由贸易区在政治上比关税同盟更可行。
The number of preferential trade agreements has greatly increased over the past two decades, yet most existing bilateral arrangements take the form of free trade areas, and less than ten percent can be considered to be fully ∞edged customs unions. This paper develops a political economy model of trade policy under imperfect competition to provide a positive explanation for the prevalence of free trade areas. In a three{ country setting, a representative from each prospective member is elected to determine the tarifis to be applied on imported goods. Under a customs union, the necessity to coordinate tarifis leads voters to strategically delegate power to more protectionist representatives. Contrary to most of the existing literature, we show that strategic delegation may imply that free trade areas increase welfare compared to customs unions. Moreover, the model also indicates that free trade areas are more likely to be politically viable than customs unions.