Intentionality detection and "mindreading": Why does game form matter?

Intentionality detection and "mindreading": Why does game form matter?
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DOI:
10.1073/pnas.97.8.4404
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发表时间:
2000-04-11
影响因子:
11.1
通讯作者:
LePore, M
LePore, M
中科院分区:
综合性期刊1区
文献类型:
--
作者:
McCabe, KA;Smith, VL;LePore, M

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到4岁左右,孩子们“可以根据他们所说或所做的事情来判断人们可能知道,思考或相信什么”。这被称为“读心术”,它建立在人类推断他人意图的能力之上。博弈论对个体A对B的意图有什么预期做出了强有力的假设,反之亦然,即每个人都是另一个人的自利对手,并且会通过使用优势和逆向归纳等基本原理来可靠地分析博弈,并且表现为好像扩展形式博弈的标准形式与后者等价。但是,扩展形式允许从实际的序列游戏中检测意图,因此在心理上不一定等同于正常形式。我们讨论巴伦-科恩的读心系统理论[巴伦-科恩,S。(1995)Mindblindness:An Essay on Autism and Theory of Mind(MIT Press,剑桥,MA)],以激励将广泛形式游戏中的行为与其相应的正常形式进行比较。正如Rapoport [Rapoport,A.(1997)Int. J. Game Theory 26,113-136]和Schotter等人[Schotter,A.,威格尔特湾& Wilson,C. 04 The Dog of the Dog(1994)6,445-468],我们发现在正常和广泛的形式之间的行为一致的差异,特别是,我们观察到合作的尝试,并在一些治疗中,我们观察到合作的实现,更频繁地发生在广泛的形式。在这种情况下,合作需要互惠,这是更难以实现的手段,在正常的意向性检测,而不是广泛的形式游戏,我们研究。
By around the age of 4 years, children "can work out what people might know, think or believe" based on what they say or do. This is called "mindreading," which builds upon the human ability to infer the intentions of others. Came theory makes a strong assumption about what individual A can expect about B's intentions and vice versa, viz, that each is a self-interested opponent of the other and will reliably analyze games by using such basic principles as dominance and backward induction, and behave as if the normal form of an extensive form game is equivalent to the latter. But the extensive form allows intentions to be detected from actual sequential play and is therefore not necessarily equivalent psychologically to the normal form. We discuss Baron-Cohen's theory of the mindreading system [Baron-Cohen, S. (1995) Mindblindness: An Essay on Autism and Theory of Mind (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA)] to motivate the comparison of behavior in an extensive form game with its corresponding normal form. As in the work of Rapoport [Rapoport, A. (1997) Int. J. Game Theory 26, 113-136] and Schotter et al. [Schotter, A., Wiegelt K. & Wilson, C. (1994) Games Econ. Behav. 6, 445-468], we find consistent differences in behavior between the normal and extensive forms, In particular, we observe attempts to cooperate, and in some treatments we observe the achievement of cooperation, occurring more frequently in the extensive form. Cooperation in this context requires reciprocity, which is more difficult to achieve by means of intentionality detection in the normal as opposed to the extensive form games we study.