Evolution of indirect reciprocity in groups of various sizes and comparison with direct reciprocity
Evolution of indirect reciprocity in groups of various sizes and comparison with direct reciprocity
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DOI：
10.1016/j.jtbi.2006.11.002
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发表时间：
2007-04-07
影响因子：
2
通讯作者：
Akiyama, Eizo
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Suzuki, Shinsuke;Akiyama, Eizo
近年来，许多研究探讨了间接互惠的演化，即合作行为是由第三个人回报的，例如，个人A帮助了B，然后从C那里得到帮助。大多数关于间接互惠的研究都假设只有两个人参与一个互动（群体），例如A帮助B，C帮助A。本文研究了当两个以上的个体参与到一个群体中时，间接互惠的演化，并与直接互惠的结果进行了比较。我们的分析表明以下几点。在具有歧视性合作者和无条件背叛者的群体中，无论是否包括实施错误，（i）两种策略都是进化稳定的，并且随着群体规模的增加，间接互惠的进化变得更加困难，以及（ii）在第三人区分正当和不正当背叛的长期声誉标准下，间接互惠的演变条件比在图像评分信誉标准下，第三个人不与之区分。此外，在人口中，也包括无条件的合作者，（iii）在实施中的错误的存在下，歧视策略是进化稳定的，不仅根据站立，但也根据图像评分，如果组的大小是大于2。最后，（iv）在没有错误的情况下，直接互惠性的演化条件与间接互惠性的演化条件是等价的，并且，在存在错误的情况下，直接互惠性的演化条件非常接近于间接互惠性的演化条件。(c)2006爱思唯尔有限公司保留所有权利。
Recently many studies have investigated the evolution of indirect reciprocity through which cooperative action is returned by a third individual, e.g. individual A helped B and then receives help from C. Most studies on indirect reciprocity have presumed that only two individuals take part in a single interaction (group), e.g. A helps B and C helps A. In this paper, we investigate the evolution of indirect reciprocity when more than two individuals take part in a single group, and compare the result with direct reciprocity through which cooperative action is directly returned by the recipient. Our analyses show the following. In the population with discriminating cooperators and unconditional defectors, whether implementation error is included or not, (i) both strategies are evolutionarily stable and the evolution of indirect reciprocity becomes more difficult as group size increases, and (ii) the condition for the evolution of indirect reciprocity under standing reputation criterion where the third individuals distinguish between justified and unjustified defections is more relaxed than that under image scoring reputation criterion in which the third individuals do not distinguish with. Furthermore, in the population that also includes unconditional cooperators, (iii) in the presence of errors in implementation, the discriminating strategy is evolutionarily stable not only under standing but also under image scoring if group size is larger than two. Finally, (iv) in the absence of errors in implementation, the condition for the evolution of direct reciprocity is equivalent to that for the evolution of indirect reciprocity under standing, and, in the presence of errors, the condition for the evolution of direct reciprocity is very close to that for the evolution of indirect reciprocity under image scoring. (c) 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.