On some myths about sequenced common-value auctions
On some myths about sequenced common-value auctions
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关于有序共同价值拍卖的一些神话
DOI：
10.1006/game.1997.0628
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发表时间：
1998
影响因子：
1.1
通讯作者：
R. Rosenthal
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
M. D. Frutos;R. Rosenthal
均衡被构造为具有相同的共同价值的对象的顺序第二价格拍卖的博弈模型的类在其中一些均衡价格平均福尔斯，在其他卖家失去了承诺，公开宣布的东西，他知道的平均。这两种可能性都是惊喜。
Equilibria are constructed for classes of game models of sequenced second-price auctions having identical common-valued objects In some of these the equilibrium price falls on average, and in others the seller loses on average by committing to announce publicly something that he knows. Both of these possibilities are surprises.