Online-offline fashion franchising supply chains without channel conflicts: Choices on postponement and contracts
Online-offline fashion franchising supply chains without channel conflicts: Choices on postponement and contracts
复制标题
DOI：
10.1016/j.ijpe.2017.05.006
复制
发表时间：
2017-05
影响因子：
12
通讯作者：
T. Choi;Yue Chen;S. Chung
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
T. Choi;Yue Chen;S. Chung
众所周知，如果线上线下运营提供相同的产品，则会引发渠道冲突。在时尚行业的许多特许经营安排下，为避免加盟商与品牌商之间的渠道冲突和互相蚕食，品牌商会在第一阶段先供应产品给加盟商进行线下销售。之后，品牌商将在第二期直接在线销售产品。本文对这种线上线下模式进行了探讨，重点研究了特许经营合同的选择和订货时间。通过对四种不同情景下的选择进行建模，我们得到了一种情景优于另一种情景的分析条件，其中包括合同类型和订购时间选项。我们从品牌所有者、特许经营者和供应链的角度来研究这个问题。我们确定的情况下，品牌所有者和供应链的最佳选择是相同的，以及帕累托改进时，可以实现的条件。
Online-offline operations are known to induce channel conflicts if the same products are offered by them. Under many franchising arrangements in the fashion industry, to avoid channel conflicts and cannibalization between the franchisee and the brand owner, the brand owner will first supply the product for the franchisee to sell offline in the first period. After that, the brand owner will sell the product online directly in the second period. We explore this online-offline model with the focal points on the choice of franchising contract and the ordering time. By modelling the choices under four different scenarios, we derive the analytical conditions in which one scenario is preferred to another scenario with respect to contract type and ordering time option. We examine the problem from the perspectives of the brand owner, the franchisee and the supply chain. We identify the situations in which the optimal choices of the brand owner and the supply chain are the same, as well as the conditions when Pareto improvement is achievable.