Sharing electricity storage
Sharing electricity storage
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DOI：
10.1109/cdc.2016.7798368
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发表时间：
2016-12
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Chenye Wu;D. Kalathil;K. Poolla;P. Varaiya
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Chenye Wu;D. Kalathil;K. Poolla;P. Varaiya
新兴的共享经济扰乱了住房和交通部门。强调的商业模式通过共享利用未充分利用的基础设施。在本文中，我们探讨了电力行业的共享经济机会。分享电力存在相当大的障碍。首先，电流是由基尔霍夫定律支配的，我们不能为其流动规定一个点对点的路径。其次，监管和政策障碍可能会阻碍机会的分享。因此，早期采用者将在仪表背后分享机会。在本文中，我们将研究其中的一个机会。具体来说，我们考虑了一系列投资于存储的公司，以针对他们面临的使用时间定价进行套利。我们发现，企业的投资决策形成了一个纳什均衡，支持社会福利。我们提供了明确的表达式，最优存储投资和现货市场中的共享存储的均衡价格。最后，我们使用现场数据来评估我们提出的共享计划的性能。
The emerging sharing economy has disrupted the housing and transportation sectors. The underlining business model exploits underutilized infrastructure through sharing. In this paper, we explore sharing economy opportunities in electricity sector. There are considerable obstacles to sharing electricity. First, the flow of electricity is governed by Kirchoff's Laws and we cannot prescribe a point to point path for its flow. Second, regulatory and policy obstacles may impede sharing opportunities. As a result, early adopters will be in the context of behind-the-meter sharing opportunities. In this paper, we study one of these opportunities. Specifically, we consider a collection of firms that invest in storage to arbitrage against the time of use pricing they face. We show that the investment decision of the firms form a Nash equilibrium which supports the social welfare. We offer explicit expressions for optimal storage investments and equilibrium prices for shared storage in a spot market. Finally, we use field data to assess the performance of our proposed sharing scheme.