Earning Limits in Fisher Markets with Spending-Constraint Utilities

Earning Limits in Fisher Markets with Spending-Constraint Utilities
复制标题

公用事业支出受限的渔市收入限制

DOI:
--
复制
发表时间:
2017
期刊:
Algorithmic Game Theory
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
K. Mehlhorn
K. Mehlhorn
中科院分区:
--
文献类型:
--
作者:
Xiaohui Bei;J. Garg;M. Hoefer;K. Mehlhorn

文献摘要

参考文献

被引文献

相似文献

在经典的费舍尔市场模型中,收入限制是一个有趣的新奇方面。在这里,卖家的收入是有限度的,如果收入超过限制,他们可以决定减少他们给市场带来的供应。除了收入限制是自然的几个应用之外,这种市场的均衡是分配不可分割的物品以最大化纳什社会福利的核心概念。
Earning limits are an interesting novel aspect in the classic Fisher market model. Here sellers have bounds on their income and can decide to lower the supply they bring to the market if income exceeds the limit. Beyond several applications, in which earning limits are natural, equilibria of such markets are a central concept in the allocation of indivisible items to maximize Nash social welfare.
DOI: 10.1145/3319394
发表时间: 2016
期刊: ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG)
影响因子: --
作者:
X. Bei;J. Garg;M. Hoefer
通讯作者: M. Hoefer