Competing by Restricting Choice: The Case of Search Platforms
Competing by Restricting Choice: The Case of Search Platforms
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.1610187
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发表时间：
2016-07
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Hanna Halaburda;M. Piskorski;Pinar Yildirim
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Hanna Halaburda;M. Piskorski;Pinar Yildirim
我们表明，一个双边平台可以通过限制其提供给客户的潜在匹配的选择来成功竞争，同时收取比无限制选择的平台更高的价格。从微观基础出发，推导出网络效应的强度和方向；增加潜在匹配的数量不仅有积极的影响，因为更多的选择，但也有消极的影响，因为在同一侧的代理人之间的竞争。具有异质外部选项的代理以不同的方式解决这两种效果之间的权衡。对于外部选项较低的代理，竞争效应强于选择效应。因此，这些代理更愿意为限制选择的平台付费。外部选项较高的代理更倾向于选择不受限制的平台。因此，两个平台可以共存，而不会出现市场倾斜。我们的模型可能有助于解释为什么不同商业模式的平台在使用在线约会的风格化模式的市场中共存。
We show that a two-sided platform can successfully compete by limiting the choice of potential matches it offers to its customers while charging higher prices than platforms with unrestricted choice. Starting from micro-foundations, we derive the strength and direction of network effect, and �?nd that increasing the number of potential matches not only has a positive effect due to larger choice, but also a negative effect due to competition between agents on the same side. Agents with heterogeneous outside options resolve the trade-off between the two effects differently. For agents with a lower outside option, the competitive effect is stronger than the choice effect. Hence, these agents have higher willingness to pay for a platform restricting choice. Agents with a higher outside option prefer a platform offering unrestricted choice. Therefore, the two platforms may coexist without the market tipping. Our model may help explain why platforms with different business models coexist in markets using the stylized model of online dating.