THE COMPARISON BETWEEN AD-VALOREM AND SPECIFIC TAXATION UNDER IMPERFECT COMPETITION
THE COMPARISON BETWEEN AD-VALOREM AND SPECIFIC TAXATION UNDER IMPERFECT COMPETITION
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DOI：
10.1016/0047-2727(92)90073-o
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发表时间：
1992-12-01
影响因子：
9.8
通讯作者：
KEEN, M
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
DELIPALLA, S;KEEN, M
本文在两种寡头垄断模型（有自由进入和无自由进入）中比较了从价税和从量税。主要结论是，从价税意味着相对较低的消费者价格、较高的税收收入，并且（在排除进入的情况下）利润较低。从福利角度来看，从价税优于从量税：在有自由进入的情况下，从量税提高福利的情形集是从价税提高福利情形集的严格子集，并且在两种模型中，在有约束性收入限制的条件下使消费者福利最大化都要求最大程度地依赖从价税。
This paper compares ad valorem and specific taxation in two models of oligopoly, with and without free entry. Predominantly ad valorem taxation implies a relatively low consumer price, high tax revenue and (when entry is precluded) low profits. Ad valorem taxation dominates specific taxation from the welfare perspective: the set of circumstances under which (with free entry) specific taxation raises welfare is a strict subset of that in which ad valorem taxation is welfare-improving, and in both models the maximisation of consumer welfare subject to a binding revenue constraint requires maximum reliance on ad valorem taxation.