Radiation dosimetry.
Radiation dosimetry.
复制标题
辐射剂量测定。
DOI：
10.1126/science.213.4508.604
复制
发表时间：
1981
期刊：
影响因子：
56.9
通讯作者：
K. Morgan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
K. Morgan
科林·诺曼（《新闻与评论》，5月8日，第652页）显然对查尔斯·库曼诺夫关于核能和煤电成本的最新预测给予了一些信任（1）。在最近的能源经济学辩论中，我的对手承认他们的论点仅仅是基于诺曼的文章，而从来没有看过库曼诺夫的书。常年反清激进分子的研究呼吁不仅仅是简单的报道，即使需要几个星期才能获得批评性的评论。与之前的文章一样，库曼诺夫使用了有问题的假设，并选择了一个代理变量来投射他想要的答案。几年前，它是单位大小：他说，然后，一个发电机组越大，它会运行得越差（2）。他仍然声称这是有效的，但看看数据就知道不是。这一次，他选择了“部门规模”，即总装机容量，核能或煤炭。通过用这些替代变量拟合公开可用的数据并推断未来，核能的数字比煤炭的数字上升得更快。关键是，这些科曼式的分析没有一个涉及真实的问题。我们将需要更多的核电厂和燃煤电厂来满足美国对电力的合理需求。我们将需要许多新的工厂，即使我们不必建造取代过时的装置和替代石油和天然气。无论我们建造什么，都将非常昂贵，而且将用严重膨胀的美元来支付。较长的交货期意味着更多的不确定性。谁能预测煤炭或核能的监管环境？成本将进一步上升，最大的因素将继续是延误、升级和通货膨胀。公用事业需要多样性。他们需要在燃料类型之间进行选择。没有人建造“普通”的核电站;如此重大的决定有许多独特的因素。在过去的几年里，政治气候有效地将核能从市场上剔除。然而，那些几年前选择建造核电站并在今天运营这些核电站的公用事业公司（三里岛除外）正在继续为他们的客户节省大量资金。例如，1980年，联邦爱迪生公司的六个大型核机组平均每千瓦时1.7美分;我们的六个大型燃煤机组每千瓦时3.6美分。如果任意将所有机组的容量系数设定为60%，并将运营费用加倍（以回答六个核电机组中有四个是交钥匙工程的论点），每千瓦时3.4美分的煤炭成本仍然会超过每千瓦时2.6美分的核电成本。拉萨尔1号核电站在1982年投入使用时，每千瓦时的运营费用约为4美分，但爱迪生1980年能源的9%来自石油（拉萨尔将取代其中的一部分），仅燃料油的成本平均为每千瓦时6美分。对带有洗涤器的新燃煤电厂的估计表明，成本甚至更高。
Colin Norman (News and Comment, 8 May, p. 652) apparently gives some cre-dence to Charles Komanoffs latest pro-jections of nuclear and coal powercosts (1). In recent energy economics debates my adversaries admitted that they were basing their case on Norman's article alone and had neverseen Komanoffs book itself. Studies by perennial antinu-clear activists call for more than simple reporting, even if it takes a couple of weeks to obtain a critical review. As in previous writings, Komanoff uses questionable assumptions and se-lects a proxy variable that projects the answer he wants. Afew years ago it was unit size: he said then that the larger a generating unit was, the worse it would run (2). He still claims this is valid, but a look at the data shows it is not. This time he chooses" sector size," the total installed capacity, nuclear or coal. By fit-ting the publicly available data with these proxy variables and extrapolating into the future the nuclear numbers pro-ject upward fasterthan those for coal. The point is that none of these Koman-off-type analyses deal with the real prob-lem. We will need more nuclear plants and more coal plants to meet the legiti-mate demand for electricity in the United States. We would require many new plants even if we did not have to build to replace obsolete units and substitute for oil and natural gas. Whatever we build will be very expensive and will be paid for with badly inflated dollars. Long lead times mean even more uncertainty. Who can predict the regulatory climate for coal or nuclear? The costs will rise further, and the biggest factors will contin-ue to bedelays, escalation, and inflation. Utilities need diversity. They need the option to choose between fuel types. Nobody builds the" average" plant; decisions of such magnitude have-many unique factors.The political climate has effectively removed nuclear power from the market-place for the past few years. However, those utilities that chose to build nuclear plants years ago and have those plants in operation today (other than Three Mile Island) are continuing to achieve sub-stantial savings for their customers. For example, Commonwealth Edison's six large nuclear units (3) averaged 1.7 cents per kilowatt-hour in 1980; our six large coal units 3.6 cents per kilowatt-hour. If one arbitrarily set thecapacity factors for all the units at 60 percent anddoubled the carrying charges (in answer to the argument that four of the six nuclear units were turn-key jobs), coal costs of 3.4 cents per kilowatt-hour would still exceed those for nuclear of 2.6 cents per kilowatt-hour. Carrying charges for the LaSalle 1 plant, when it comes on-line in 1982, will be about 4 cents per kilowatthour, but the cost offuel oil alone for the 9 percent of Edison's 1980 energy that came from oil (some of which LaSalle will displace) averaged 6 cents per kilowatt-hour. Estimates for new coal plants with scrubbers point toward even higher costs.