TWO-SIDED MATCHING WITH EXTERNALITIES: A SURVEY
TWO-SIDED MATCHING WITH EXTERNALITIES: A SURVEY
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DOI：
10.15807/jorsj.59.35
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发表时间：
2016-03
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Keisuke Bando;Ryo Kawasaki;S. Muto
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Keisuke Bando;Ryo Kawasaki;S. Muto
过去几年，关于具有外部性的双边匹配市场的文献不断增加，因为它现在是双边匹配理论研究的主要主题之一。具有外部性的匹配市场与经典匹配市场的不同之处在于，代理人不仅关心自己与谁匹配，而且还关心其他代理人与谁匹配。在本次调查中，我们从一对一案例的具有外部性的双边匹配市场开始，然后关注多对一案例。对于多对一匹配问题，这些外部性通常以两种方式存在。首先，“多方”的代理可能关心他们的同事是谁，即还有谁与同一“方”匹配。其次，“一方”可能关心其他方如何匹配。
The literature on two-sided matching markets with externalities has grown over the past several years, as it is now one of the primary topics of research in two-sided matching theory. A matching market with externalities is different from the classical matching market in that agents not only care about who they are matched with, but also care about whom other agents are matched to. In this survey, we start with two-sided matching markets with externalities for the one-to-one case and then focus on the many-to-one case. For many-to-one matching problems, these externalities often are present in two ways. First, the agents on the \many" side may care about who their colleagues are, that is, who else is matched to the same \one." Second, the \one" side may care about how the others are matched.