Pareto-improving social optimal pricing schemes based on bottleneck permits for managing congestion at a merging section
Pareto-improving social optimal pricing schemes based on bottleneck permits for managing congestion at a merging section
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DOI：
10.1080/15568318.2017.1312646
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发表时间：
2017-04
影响因子：
3.9
通讯作者：
Katsuya Sakai;Ronghui Liu;Takahiko Kusakabe;Y. Asakura
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Katsuya Sakai;Ronghui Liu;Takahiko Kusakabe;Y. Asakura
摘要赤松、佐藤和阮（2006）提出了一种基于瓶颈许可概念的最优定价方案。该计划允许许可证持有人在特定时间通过瓶颈，并被证明能够最大限度地减少社会成本。然而，该计划并不总是帕累托改进，因为它可能会伤害一些司机。本研究的目的是针对一个二对一的V型合并瓶颈，设计一个具有瓶颈许可的帕累托改进定价方案。首先，建立了网络中的早晨通勤模型，描述了具有合并瓶颈的网络中的到达时间选择均衡。其次，我们证明了这个V形网络的瓶颈许可证的第一最佳定价方案并不总是实现帕累托改进，其中一组司机的成本增加了许可证定价，这一现象类似于Arnott，de Palma和Lindsey（1993）的瓶颈悖论。我们提出了三个实现的瓶颈许可的帕累托改进：（1）合并优先级规则包括在瓶颈许可计划，通过创建不同的市场为每个原产地;（2）许可证收入作为货币补偿的司机的成本增加;（3）许可证收入用于扩大瓶颈容量。对于每一个实施方案，我们得到他们的均衡解决方案，并证明，帕累托改进的实现和社会成本降低，通过使用许可证收入扩大瓶颈容量。
ABSTRACT Akamatsu, Sato, and Nguyen (2006) proposed a first-best pricing scheme based on the concept of bottleneck permits. The scheme allows permit holders to pass a bottleneck at specified times and is shown to be able to minimize social cost. However, the scheme is not always Pareto-improving in that it may harm some drivers. The objective of this study is to design Pareto-improving pricing scheme with bottleneck permits for a V-shaped two-to-one merge bottleneck. First, the paper formulates the morning commute model in the network and describes the arrival time choice equilibrium in the network with merging bottleneck. Secondly, we show that the first-best pricing scheme with bottleneck permits for this V-shaped network does not always achieve a Pareto improvement, with the cost of one group of drivers is increased by the permit pricing, a phenomena akin to the bottleneck paradox of Arnott, de Palma, and Lindsey (1993). We propose three implementations of bottleneck permits for Pareto-improving: (1) merging priority rule is included in the bottleneck permits scheme by creating different market for each origin; (2) the permit revenues are refunded as monetary compensation to drivers whose cost is increased; and (3) the permit revenues are used to expand bottleneck capacity. For each implementation, we derive their equilibrium solutions and demonstrate that the Pareto improvement is achieved and social cost is decreased by using the permit revenues for expanding the bottleneck capacity.