An Eye for an Eye: Economics of Retaliation in Mining Pools
An Eye for an Eye: Economics of Retaliation in Mining Pools
复制标题
以眼还眼：矿池报复的经济学
DOI：
10.1145/3318041.3355472
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发表时间：
2019
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Yongdae Kim
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Yujin Kwon;Hyoungshick Kim;Yung Yi;Yongdae Kim
目前，矿工通常加入矿池共同解决密码难题，矿池竞争非常激烈。这导致了多种攻击策略的发展，例如区块扣留（BWH）和扣留后分叉（FAW）攻击，这些攻击可能会削弱 PoW 系统的健康状况，但会最大化矿池的利润。在本文中，我们提出了称为自适应报复策略 (ARS) 的策略，不仅可以减轻 BWH 攻击，还可以减轻 FAW 攻击。在ARS中，每个池在正常情况下与其他池合作，并且仅在受到攻击时自适应地执行FAW或BWH攻击以达到报复的目的。此外，为了让理性矿池采用 ARS，ARS 应该在报复和自私之间取得适应性平衡，因为即使矿池进行报复，也会考虑自己的收益。我们从理论上和数值上表明，ARS不仅会导致矿池之间进入无攻击状态，而且还能实现报复与自私之间的自适应平衡。
Currently, miners typically join mining pools to solve cryptographic puzzles together, and mining pools are in high competition. This has led to the development of several attack strategies such as block withholding (BWH) and fork after withholding (FAW) attacks that can weaken the health of PoW systems and but maximize mining pools' profits. In this paper, we present strategies called Adaptive Retaliation Strategies (ARS) to mitigate not only BWH attacks but also FAW attacks. In ARS, each pool cooperates with other pools in the normal situation, and adaptively executes either FAW or BWH attacks for the purpose of retaliation only when attacked. In addition, in order for rational pools to adopt ARS, ARS should strike to an adaptive balance between retaliation and selfishness because the pools consider their payoff even when they retaliate. We theoretically and numerically show that ARS would not only lead to the induction of a no-attack state among mining pools, but also achieve the adaptive balance between retaliation and selfishness.