Reasons and the ambiguity of 'belief'
Reasons and the ambiguity of 'belief'
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“信仰”的原因和模糊性
DOI：
10.1080/13869790701772435
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发表时间：
2008
影响因子：
0.6
通讯作者：
Alvarez M
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Alvarez M
在文献中可以找到两种关于激励原因的概念，即我们采取行动的原因：（1）占主导地位的“心理学概念”，它认为激励原因是主体相信某事； （2）“非心理”概念，少数派观点，认为它们是主体所相信的，即他的信念。在本文中，我概述了少数派观点的一个版本，并为其辩护，以应对那些被认为是不可克服的困难，特别是有关“错误案例”（代理人认为错误的情况）的困难；以及解释行动的困难。关于错误案例，我认为，如果我们被相信的真实事物所激励，那么激励我们采取行动的就是激励理由。相比之下，如果我们被一些被认为是错误的东西所激励，那么激励我们采取行动的仅仅是一个明显的激励理由。不管怎样，正如非心理学概念所说，激励我们的是我们所相信的东西，而不是我们所相信的东西。我对动机原因和行动解释之间的关系进行了阐述，并认为这一阐述有助于提出两个重要观点。一是我们经常、有时甚至必须使用诸如“他这样做是因为他相信 p”之类的解释，这一事实并不能证明动机原因的心理学概念是正确的。另一个是，认可动机原因的非心理学概念并不意味着人们对行动的解释采取非事实的观点。
Two conceptions of motivating reasons, i.e. the reasons for which we act, can be found in the literature: (1) the dominant ‘psychological conception’, which says that motivating reasons are an agent's believing something; and (2) the ‘non-psychological’ conception, the minority view, which says that they are what the agent believes, i.e. his beliefs. In this paper I outline a version of the minority view, and defend it against what have been thought to be insuperable difficulties – in particular, difficulties concerning ‘error cases’ (cases where what the agent believes is false); and difficulties concerning the explanation of action. Concerning error cases, I argue that if we are motivated by something believed that is true, what motivates us to act is a motivating reason. By contrast, if we are motivated by something believed that is false, then what motivates us to act is merely an apparent motivating reason. Either way, what motivates us is, as the non-psychological conception says, what we believe and not our believing it. I offer an account of the relation between motivating reasons and the explanation of action, and argue that this account helps bring out two important points. One is that the fact that we often do, and indeed sometimes must, use explanations such as ‘He did it because he believed that p’ does not vindicate the psychological conception of motivating reasons. The other is that endorsing the non-psychological conception of motivating reasons does not commit one to a non-factive view of explanations of action.