Multi-channel attacks
Multi-channel attacks
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DOI：
10.1007/978-3-540-45238-6_2
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发表时间：
2003-01-01
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Rohatgi, P
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Agrawal, D;Rao, JR;Rohatgi, P
我们引入多通道攻击，即，边信道攻击，同时利用多个边信道，如功率和电磁。我们提出了一个对抗模型，它结合了CMOS泄漏模型和最大似然原理来执行和分析这种攻击。该模型对于推导用于信道选择和数据分析的最佳且经常是反直觉的技术是必不可少的。我们表明，使用多个通道是更好的模板攻击的实验表明，减少了三倍的错误概率。开发针对多通道攻击的可靠对策需要严格的泄漏评估方法。在适当的假设和近似下，我们的模型还产生了一个实用的评估方法，用于评估芯片卡等受限设备中电源和所有可用EM通道的净信息泄漏。经典的DPA/DEMA风格的攻击假设对手比我们的模型弱。对于这个对手，我们应用最大似然原理，这样的设计新的和更有效的单通道和多通道DPA/DEMA攻击。
We introduce multi-channel attacks, i.e., side-channel attacks which utilize multiple side-channels such as power and EM simultaneously. We propose an adversarial model which combines a CMOS leakage model and the maximum-likelihood principle for performing and analyzing such attacks. This model is essential for deriving the optimal and very often counter-intuitive techniques for channel selection and data analysis. We show that using multiple channels is better for template attacks by experimentally showing a three-fold reduction in the error probability. Developing sound countermeasures against multi-channel attacks requires a rigorous leakage assessment methodology. Under suitable assumptions and approximations, our model also yields a practical assessment methodology for net information leakage from the power and all available EM channels in constrained devices such as chip-cards. Classical DPA/DEMA style attacks assume an adversary weaker than that of our model. For this adversary, we apply the maximum-likelihood principle to such design new and more efficient single and multiple-channel DPA/DEMA attacks.