Combinatorial information market design
Combinatorial information market design
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DOI：
10.1023/a:1022058209073
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发表时间：
2003-01-01
影响因子：
5.9
通讯作者：
Hanson, R
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Hanson, R
信息市场是为聚合信息而创建的市场。这类市场通常通过对某些变量值的押注来估计这些变量值的概率分布。组合信息市场将通过允许对所有变量值组合进行下注来聚合关于多个变量的整个联合概率分布的信息。为了实现这一目标，我们希望克服困扰标准信息市场的薄薄市场和非理性参与问题。评分规则避免了这些问题，但却在厚重的市场案例中遭遇了意见汇集问题。市场评分规则避免了所有这些问题，它在厚市场情况下成为自动做市商，在薄市场情况下成为简单的评分规则。对数版本具有成本和模块化优势。在介绍了市场评分规则之后，我们考虑了几个设计问题，包括如何表示变量以支持条件和无条件估计，如何避免因计算概率错误而成为金钱泵，以及如何确保用户可以支付他们的赌注，而不会不必要地阻止他们使用以前的赌注作为未来赌注的抵押品。
Information markets are markets created to aggregate information. Such markets usually estimate a probability distribution over the values of certain variables, via bets on those values. Combinatorial information markets would aggregate information on the entire joint probability distribution over many variables, by allowing bets on all variable value combinations. To achieve this, we want to overcome the thin market and irrational participation problems that plague standard information markets. Scoring rules avoid these problems, but instead suffer from opinion pooling problems in the thick market case. Market scoring rules avoid all these problems, by becoming automated market makers in the thick market case and simple scoring rules in the thin market case. Logarithmic versions have cost and modularity advantages. After introducing market scoring rules, we consider several design issues, including how to represent variables to support both conditional and unconditional estimates, how to avoid becoming a money pump via errors in calculating probabilities, and how to ensure that users can cover their bets, without needlessly preventing them from using previous bets as collateral for future bets.