Narrative self-shaping: a modest proposal

Narrative self-shaping: a modest proposal
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叙事自我塑造:一个温和的建议

DOI:
10.1007/s11097-014-9352-4
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发表时间:
2016
影响因子:
2.3
通讯作者:
Daniel D. Hutto
Daniel D. Hutto
中科院分区:
--
文献类型:
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作者:
Daniel D. Hutto

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本文试图将适度解释的叙事自我塑造假说(NSSH)与强叙事主义脱钩,以激励我们将智力精力投入到前者上。第一节简要介绍了自我塑造的概念,并阐述了以下观点的理由:自我塑造,以适当驯服的形式,至少在某种程度上,对于反思性存在来说是不可避免的。正是在这种背景下,阐明了适度的叙事自我塑造假说(NSSH)的基本承诺。第二节确定了所有强叙事主义提案的基本承诺——中心原则——这些提案在叙事自我塑造和叙事自我体验之间建立了必要的联系。正如将要展示的,在强叙事主义者手中,后一个概念通过诉诸隐性叙事的概念以更强或更弱的方式被解开。第三节提醒读者斯特劳森(2004a)对强叙事主义的挑战。据透露,斯特劳森的反对意见如果针对的是强叙事主义的中心原则,即被解释为关于自我体验所必需的现象学启示,而不仅仅是心理叙事论文(被解释为关于典型叙事倾向的经验假设),那么它们的反对意见是最有效的。做好准备后,第四节批判性地审视了陆克文(Rudd,2012)和谢赫特曼(Schechtman,2007)分别为摆脱斯特劳森强叙事主义困境而采取的两种不同策略。最后,这两种策略都在关键时刻援引了隐性叙事的概念。第五节揭示了关于隐性叙事可能是什么的实质性建议,因此我们没有理由相信它确实发生了。结论是,就目前情况而言,强叙事主义无法避免斯特劳森困境。最后一节的简短结论提醒我们,尽管 NSSH 的温和版本(与有关我们民间心理能力的叙事基础的发展建议相结合)虽然谦虚,但并非平凡,值得进一步发展和研究。
Decoupling a modestly construed Narrative Self Shaping Hypothesis (or NSSH) from Strong Narrativism this paper attempts to motivate devoting our intellectual energies to the former. Section one briefly introduces the notions of self-shaping and rehearses reasons for thinking that self-shaping, in a suitably tame form, is, at least to some extent, simply unavoidable for reflective beings. It is against this background that the basic commitments of a modest Narrative Self-Shaping Hypothesis (or NSSH) are articulated. Section two identifies a foundational commitment—the central tenet—of all Strong Narrativist proposals, those that posit a necessary link between narrative self-shaping and narrative self-experience. As will be shown, in the hands of Strong Narrativists the latter notion is unpacked in stronger or weaker ways by appeal to the notion of implicit Narrativizing. Section three reminds the reader of Strawson’s (2004a) challenge to Strong Narrativism. It is revealed that Strawson’s objections are most effective if they target Strong Narrativism’s central tenet construed as a phenomenological revelation about what is necessary for self-experience and not merely the psychological Narrativity thesis, construed as an empirical hypothesis about typical Narrativizing proclivities. Having set the stage, section four critically examines two different strategies, pursued by Rudd (2012) and Schechtman (2007) respectively, for escaping the horns Strawson’s dilemma poses for Strong Narrativism. In the end both strategies invoke the notion of implicit Narrativizing at a crucial juncture. Section five reveals that a substantive proposal about what implicit Narrativizing might be is lacking, hence we have no reason to believe that it actually occurs. It is concluded that, as things stand, Strong Narrativism has no way of avoiding the horns of Strawson’s dilemma. Brief concluding remarks in the final section are a reminder why, despite their modesty, softer versions of the NSSH—when coupled with a developmental proposal about the narrative basis of our folk psychological competence—are non-trivial and worthy of further development and investigation.