Regulatory incentives and financial reporting quality in public healthcare organisations
Regulatory incentives and financial reporting quality in public healthcare organisations
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公共医疗机构的监管激励措施和财务报告质量
DOI：
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发表时间：
2017
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影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Lei Tao
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
M. Greenwood;Richard M. Baylis;Lei Tao
英国国民健康服务基金会信托基金受监管制度的约束，其中监测和干预的水平由两个关键绩效指标决定：“财务风险评级”，基于一系列绩效指标，如报告的盈余利润率和资产回报率，以及“审慎借贷限制”。在本文中，我们研究了财务报告质量的变化，以可自由支配的应计利润为代表，并引入了这一制度的激励。我们发现：首先，可自由支配的应计项目被设法报告小额盈余；第二，与避免短期和中期监管干预相一致，当预管理绩效低于干预触发阈值时，可自由支配的应计利润更为积极，而当远高于阈值时，可自由支配的应计利润则更为消极；第三，尽管不再将财务盈亏平衡作为主要业绩目标，但仍存在对小额亏损报告的厌恶。我们进一步发现，可自由支配的应计利润水平是由两个具有战略意义的指标驱动的：盈余利润率（留存收益的衡量标准）和审慎借贷限额（借贷能力的衡量标准）。
English National Health Service Foundation Trusts are subject to a regulatory regime in which the level of monitoring and intervention is determined by performance against two key performance metrics: a ‘financial risk rating’, based on a number of performance metrics, such as the reported surplus margin and return on assets, and a ‘prudential borrowing limit’. In this paper, we investigate the variation in financial reporting quality, proxied by discretionary accruals, with the incentives introduced by this regime. We find: first, that discretionary accruals are managed to report small surpluses; second, that, consistent with the avoidance of regulatory intervention in both the short and medium term, discretionary accruals are more positive when pre-managed performance is below intervention triggering thresholds and more negative when well above threshold; third, that, despite a move away from financial breakeven as the primary performance objective, there remains an aversion to small loss reporting. We further find that the level of discretionary accruals is driven by two metrics of strategic significance: the surplus margin (a measure of retained earnings) and the prudential borrowing limit (a measure of borrowing capacity).