Tense
Tense
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紧张
DOI：
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发表时间：
1981
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影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Roderick M. Chisholm
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文献类型：
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作者：
Roderick M. Chisholm
存在的东西是不断变化的。这个事实要求我们认真对待时态。让我们说一个陈述是一个“简单时态陈述”，只是在它把一个属性F归于一个个体a（把一个关系R归于一对a和B）的情况下，它在逻辑上等价于“a现在是F”（“a现在对B有R”）。只有当我们坚持一些简单的时态陈述表达真理，同时抵制所有将哲学释义成无时态语言的尝试时，我们才能认真对待时态。我们的问题是：那些认真对待时态的人是否也需要“认真对待无时态”？也就是说，既然我们必须认识到不可消除的紧张的真理，以便理解事物变化的事实，那么有什么理由允许一些无意义的taxis表达真理，但抵制所有的释义成为tensediom？我们不这么认为。考虑一个形式为“x是F”的陈述，其中的“是”不能被理解为简单的现在时--例如，“博尔扎诺是第一个理解连续性的人”，其中的“历史现在时”被用来描述一个显然现在没有发生的事件。如果这个无时态的“is”不等同于“is now，was，or will be”，那么它能表达什么呢？当然，这句话意味着，并暗示了“博尔扎诺要么是，要么是，或将是第一个理解连续性”。历史现在时表示那些没有特殊原因而认真对待时态的人也会认真对待无意义。但是，还有其他种类的陈述，在某些哲学家看来，似乎是无张力的。两种类型经常被引用：“永恒的真理”，如二加二等于四;和关于神的真理，谁是经常说诺依31：2（1997）262-265
What exists is constantly changing. This fact requires that we take tense seriously. Let us say that a statement is a “simple tensed statement” just in case it attributes a propertyF to an individuala (ascribes a relationR to a paira and b) and it is logically equivalent to “ a is now F” (“ a now bearsR to b”). We take tense seriously only if we insist that some simple tensed statements express truths while resisting all attempts at philosophical paraphrase into a tenseless language. Our question is this: Do those who take tense seriously also need to “take tenselessness seriously”? That is, given that we must recognize ineliminably tensed truths in order to make sense of the fact that things change, is there any reason to allow that sometenseless tatements express truths but resist all paraphrase into a tensedidiom? We think not. Consider a statement of the form “ x is F”, in which the “is” cannot be understood as simply present-tensed—for example, “Bolzano is the first to understand continuity”, in which the “historical present tense” is used to describe an event which is obviously not occurring now. What could this tenseless “is” convey, if it is not equivalent to “is now, was, or will be”? Surely the statement implies and is implied by “Bolzano either is, was, or will be the first to understand continuity”. The historical present tense presents those who take tense seriously with no special reason to also take t nselessness seriously. But there are other kinds of statement which have seemed intractably tenseless to some philosophers. Two types are frequently cited: the “eternal truths”, such as that two plus two is four; and truths about the Deity, who is often said to be NOÛS 31:2 (1997) 262–265