Do market incentives crowd out charitable giving?
Do market incentives crowd out charitable giving?
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DOI：
10.1016/j.socec.2013.08.007
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发表时间：
2013-12-01
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Kimbrough, Erik O.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Deck, Cary;Kimbrough, Erik O.
捐赠和志愿服务可以被视为明确价格为零的市场交易。然而，有证据表明，当涉及到亲社会行为时，人们可能不会将零视为另一个价格。因此，尽管市场可能会增加那些需要帮助的人的资产供应，但有些人担心这种金融激励会挤出利他主义的捐赠。本文报告了实验室实验直接调查的程度，市场激励排挤大，离散的慈善捐赠，在设置相关的死者器官捐赠。结果表明，市场增加了向有需要的人提供的资产供应。然而，正如一些批评者所担心的那样，市场激励措施对相对贫穷的人产生了不成比例的影响。(C)2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Donations and volunteerism can be conceived as market transactions with a zero explicit price. However, evidence suggests people may not view zero as just another price when it comes to pro-social behavior. Thus, while markets might be expected to increase the supply of assets available to those in need, some worry such financial incentives will crowd out altruistic giving. This paper reports laboratory experiments directly investigating the degree to which market incentives crowd out large, discrete charitable donations in a setting related to deceased organ donation. The results suggest markets increase the supply of assets available to those in need. However, as some critics fear, market incentives disproportionately influence the relatively poor. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.