The Economics of Hubs: The Case of Monopoly
The Economics of Hubs: The Case of Monopoly
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枢纽经济学：垄断案例
DOI：
10.2307/2297842
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发表时间：
1995
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
G. Tan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
K. Hendricks;Michele Piccione;G. Tan
在本文中，我们研究了一家不受监管的航空公司的优化问题，该航空公司被授予满足任意两个城市之间航空旅行需求的专有权。它选择一个连接网络和一组价格来实现利润最大化。因此，网络设计和价格都是内生的。当需求和成本对称时，我们描述了该优化问题的解决方案。我们的主要结果是，如果在两个直接相连的城市之间出行的人数存在密度经济，则最佳网络要么是规模为 n − 1 的枢纽，要么是每对城市都直接相连的枢纽。
In this paper, we study the optimization problem of an unregulated air carrier which is given the exclusive right to satisfy demand for air travel between any pair of cities. It chooses a network of connections and a set of prices to maximize profits. Thus, both network design and prices are endogenous. We characterize the solution to this optimization problem when demands and costs are symmetric. Our main result is that, if there are economies of density in the number of individuals travelling between two directly connected cities, the optimal network is either a hub of size n − 1 or one in which every pair of cities is connected directly.