More than Thirty Years of Ultimatum Bargaining Experiments: Motives, Variations, and a Survey of the Recent Literature
More than Thirty Years of Ultimatum Bargaining Experiments: Motives, Variations, and a Survey of the Recent Literature
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DOI：
10.5282/ubm/epub.18175
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发表时间：
2013-08
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
W. Güth;M. Kocher
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
W. Güth;M. Kocher
要么接受，要么离开--它提供的东西可能和人类一样古老。我们在这里的目标是，首先，提供一个可能带有主观色彩的关于最初最后通牒游戏实验的回忆，它的动机和立即的反应。第二，我们在一个统一的框架下讨论了标准最后通牒谈判博弈的重要扩展，第三，我们综述了自世纪之交以来发表的实验最后通牒谈判文献。文章认为，最后通牒游戏是研究讨价还价和社会偏好的一种非常通用的工具。最后，我们提供了开放研究问题的例子和未来研究的方向。
Take-it or leave-it offers are probably as old as mankind. Our objective here is, first, to provide a, probably subjectively-colored, recollection of the initial ultimatum game experiment, its motivation and the immediate responses. Second, we discuss important extensions of the standard ultimatum bargaining game in a unified framework, and, third, we offer a survey of the experimental ultimatum bargaining literature containing papers published since the turn of the century. The paper argues that the ultimatum game is an extremely versatile tool for research in bargaining and on social preferences. Finally, we provide examples for open research questions and directions for future studies.