Evidence from Goodwill Non-impairments on the Effects of Unverifiable Fair-Value Accounting
Evidence from Goodwill Non-impairments on the Effects of Unverifiable Fair-Value Accounting
复制标题
商誉不减值对无法核实的公允价值会计影响的证据
DOI:
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发表时间:
2007
期刊:
影响因子:
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通讯作者:
R. Watts
中科院分区:
文献类型:
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作者:
K. Ramanna;R. Watts
SFAS 142 requires firms to use unverifiable fair-value estimates to determine goodwill impairments. Standard setters suggest managers will use the discretion given by such estimates to convey private information on future cash flows, while agency theory predicts managers will use the discretion opportunistically. We test these alternative hypotheses using a sample of firms with market indications of goodwill impairment (firms with book goodwill and two successive years of book-to-market ratios above one). We find non-impairment of goodwill is increasing in firm characteristics predicted to be associated with greater managerial discretion. We also find evidence that the discretion is being used in a manner consistent with agency-based predictions. The evidence does not confirm managerial discretion is being used to convey private information. * We thank Paul Healy, S. P. Kothari, Richard Leftwich (the editor), Sugata Roychowdhury, Edward Riedl, the anonymous referees, and seminar participants at Chinese University of Hong Kong, Harvard University, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, University of Alberta, and University of Connecticut for helpful comments; the division of research at Harvard Business School for research assistance; and Harvard University and Massachusetts Institute of Technology for financial support. Any errors are our responsibility. 1