Cheap talk, cooperation, and trust in global software engineering
Cheap talk, cooperation, and trust in global software engineering
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全球软件工程中的廉价谈话、合作和信任
DOI：
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发表时间：
2016
影响因子：
4.1
通讯作者：
D. Redmiles
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Yi Wang;D. Redmiles
在我们对全球软件工程（GSE）团队的研究中，我们发现非正式的、与工作无关的对话与信任呈正相关。为了使用新的分析技术来更仔细地调查这一现象，我们通过采用经济学文献中的“廉价谈话”概念来描述这些与工作无关的对话，并使用进化博弈论（EGT）对其进行了研究。更具体地说，我们修改了经典的Stag-hunt游戏，并分析了固定人口设置（GSE团队的抽象）中的动态。这样做，我们就能够证明互联网上的廉价谈话（e-cheap talk）是多么强大，足以促进信任的出现，并提高合作的可能性，其中对不合作行为的惩罚与廉价谈话的成本相当。为了验证我们的理论方法的结果，我们进行了两个实证案例研究，分析了Apache Lucene（http：//lucene.apache. org/）和Chromium OS（http：//www.chromium.org/chromium-os）。结果为理论命题提供了普遍支持。我们讨论了我们的研究结果和理论和实践的影响，GSE的合作和研究。
In our studies of global software engineering (GSE) teams, we found that informal, non-work-related conversations are positively associated with trust. Seeking to use novel analytical techniques to more carefully investigate this phenomenon, we described these non-work-related conversations by adapting the economics literature concept of “cheap talk,” and studied it using Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT). More specifically, we modified the classic Stag-hunt game and analyzed the dynamics in a fixed population setting (an abstraction of a GSE team). Doing so, we were able to demonstrate how cheap talk over the Internet (e-cheap talk) was powerful enough to facilitate the emergence of trust and improve the probability of cooperation where the punishment for uncooperative behavior is comparable to the cost of the cheap talk. To validate the results of our theoretical approach, we conducted two empirical case studies that analyzed the logged IRC development discussions of Apache Lucene (http://lucene.apache. org/) and Chromium OS (http://www.chromium.org/chromium-os) using both quantitative and qualitative methods. The results provide general support to the theoretical propositions. We discuss our findings and the theoretical and practical implications to GSE collaborations and research.