Raw Materials, Profits, and the Productivity Slowdown: Some Doubts
Raw Materials, Profits, and the Productivity Slowdown: Some Doubts
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原材料、利润和生产率放缓:一些疑虑
DOI:
10.2307/1884647
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发表时间:
1986
影响因子:
13.7
通讯作者:
David B Grubb
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
David B Grubb
Bruno [1984] argues that a fall in material input, for given levels of capital and labor input, can explain a measured fall in productivity growth which in most OECD countries first appeared after 1973. This comment asks the following: 1. Do the available output statistics show a fall in gross output, as the materials hypothesis explanation of the productivity slowdown requires? Or do they show a fall in real value added, defined as gross output less material input, which indicates a fall in "technical progress?" I conclude that the materials hypothesis cannot explain falls in productivity growth measured using GDP data, but could explain partperhaps 0.5 percent per annumof the fall measured using the index of manufacturing production. 2. What materials price and quantity movements have occurred? To isolate the component of material prices that is exogenous, common to all OECD countries, and excludes energy costs, I look at the U. N. price index for basic commodities imported by developed countries. The rise in real raw material prices was much smaller in terms of its cost to importing countries than the oil price rise, and by the late 1970s real industrial materials prices had fallen back to the levels of the 1960s. While a general index of material input quantities is not available, data for metals, one major component of materials, suggest that this input has fallen by about 2 percent per annum since the early 1970s relative to output and to earlier trends. So statistics which directly evaluate measurement biases, and material input prices and quantities, suggest that substitution away from material inputs cannot explain much of the fall in productivity growth.