Strategy-Proofness and Essentially Single-Valued Cores: A Comment
Strategy-Proofness and Essentially Single-Valued Cores: A Comment
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策略验证和本质上单值核心：评论
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.391462
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发表时间：
2003
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
S. Lahiri
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
S. Lahiri
在本文中，我们提供了Sonmez[1991]中可用的不可分良好分配广义模型的另一种选择。在这种情况下，我们证明了一个分配规则是弱联合策略证明的充分条件。在一个温和的定域假设下，在Pareto最优分配规则存在的条件下，证明了该规则对于本质单值Pareto对应是充分的，因此对于本质单值核对应也是充分的。
In this paper we provide an alternative to the generalized model of indivisible good allocation available in Sonmez [1991]. In this context we prove a theorem that gives sufficient conditions for an allocation rule to be weakly coalitionally strategy-proof. We also prove that with existence of a Pareto optimal allocation rule along with another condition introduced in this paper, is sufficient for essentially single-valued Pareto correspondence and hence is also sufficient for essentially single-valued core correspondence, in the presence of a mild domain assumption.