Deception under Competitive Intermediation
Deception under Competitive Intermediation
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发表时间：
2015
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通讯作者：
T. Murooka
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作者：
T. Murooka
本文研究了中介机构|如抵押贷款经纪人、财务顾问或保险销售人员|教育那些误解产品价值的消费者的动机。两种类型的公司通过竞争的共同代理中介机构销售产品并支付销售佣金。一种销售透明的产品，而另一种销售具有隐藏费用、质量或风险的欺骗性产品。每个中间商都会选择提供哪种产品以及是否向消费者提供有关隐藏属性的教育。我证明，当且仅当误解程度很大时，中介才会采用欺骗手段。如果发生欺骗行为，中介机构尽管存在竞争，仍能赚取高额佣金。此外，由于消费者最终承担此类佣金的成本，因此当中介机构能够教育消费者时，消费者福利会比不能教育消费者时更低。监管委员会|类似于美国抵押贷款行业以及澳大利亚和英国共同基金行业的最新政策|可能会导致中介机构揭露任何隐藏的属性。我还提供了一个从市场数据中检测此类欺骗的条件。
This paper investigates the incentive of intermediaries|such as mortgage brokers, nancial advisors, or insurance salespeople|to educate consumers who misperceive the value of products. Two types of rms sell products through competing common-agent intermediaries and pay commissions for sales. One sells a transparent product, while the other sells a deceptive product that has a hidden fee, quality, or risk. Each intermediary chooses which product to oer and whether or not to educate consumers about the hidden attribute. I show that intermediaries employ deception if and only if the degree of misperception is large. If deception occurs, intermediaries earn high commissions despite competition. Furthermore, because consumers ultimately bear the cost of such commissions, consumer welfare is lower when intermediaries can educate consumers than when they cannot. Regulating commissions|analogous to recent policies in the US mortgage industry as well as in the Australian and UK mutual-fund industries|can lead intermediaries to reveal any hidden attribute. I also provide a condition to detect such deception from market data.