Inequality and Personal Income Taxation
Inequality and Personal Income Taxation
复制标题
不平等与个人所得税
DOI：
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发表时间：
2013
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Carlos Scartascini
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Martín Ardanaz;Carlos Scartascini
为什么尽管经历了民主进步和经济快速增长时期，许多发展中国家的个人所得税仍然相对较低？这一程式化的事实很难与标准的税收政治经济学模型相一致，这些模型期望民主政权在遭受严重不平等的国家带来再分配。这篇文章认为，政治制度的细节是理解为什么许多发展中国家和不平等国家的收入差距仍然很低的关键。特别是，我们展示了立法分配不当如何通过扭曲政治权力在不同群体之间的分配来防止将个人所得税作为主要收入来源的使用。分配不公通常不是外生的，而是那些在转型或改革时刻拥有政治权力的人设计的结果。因此，它取决于社会中的政治和经济权力结构。基于1990年至2007年期间50多个国家的样本，本文发现：(A)历史上财富和收入分配越不平等的国家往往系统性地出现更高的立法不当分配水平；(B)较高的不平等分配水平与较低的个人所得税占GDP的份额有关。
Why does personal income taxation (PIT) remain relatively low in many developing countries despite a period of democratic advancement and rapid economic growth? This stylized fact is hard to reconcile with standard political economy models of taxation that expect democratic regimes to bring about redistribution in countries that suffer from high inequality. This article argues that the details of political institutions are key to understand why PIT remains low in many developing and unequal countries. In particular, we show how legislative malapportionment may prevent the use of personal income taxes as a major revenue source by skewing the distribution of political power across groups. Malapportionment is usually not exogenous but the result of design by those with political power at the transition or reform moment. As such, it depends on the structure of political and economic power in society. Based on a sample of more than 50 countries between 1990 and 2007, this article finds that (a) countries with historically more unequal distributions of wealth and income tend to systematically present higher levels of legislative malapportionment and (b) higher levels of malapportionment are associated with lower shares of personal income taxes in GDP.
DOI：
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发表时间：
2011
期刊：
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影响因子：
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作者：
Besley Timothy
通讯作者：
Besley Timothy