Relational autonomy, liberal individualism, and the social constitution of selves
Relational autonomy, liberal individualism, and the social constitution of selves
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DOI：
10.1023/b:phil.0000014532.56866.5c
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发表时间：
2004-01-01
影响因子：
1.3
通讯作者：
Christman, J
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Christman, J
对自由主义的规范性前提的哲学怀疑往往集中在所谓的自治概念的超个人主义和在其中心运作的自治的人。社群主义者、女权主义者、身份政治理论家和其他人都以不同的方式声称，自由主义原则所基于的自主主体模型假定了一种关于人类身份、价值和承诺的概念，这种概念无视我们自我概念的嵌入性、我们动机的根本关系性质以及我们存在的整体社会特征。女权主义者尤其强烈地主张，自由主义政治的核心自主概念必须重新配置，以便对定义我们生活的照顾、相互依赖和相互支持的关系更加敏感，这些关系传统上标志着女性的领域。[1]从这一讨论中浮现出一种关于自主者的观点，这种观点的结构是为了完全接受这种自我的社会概念。“关系自主”是一个标签，它被赋予了另一种概念，即作为一个自由的、自治的主体意味着什么，这个主体也是社会构成的，并且可能根据人际关系和相互依赖来定义她的基本价值承诺。[2]因此，自主者的关系观强调了自我的社会嵌入性，同时也没有放弃（在很大程度上是自由主义的）正义的基本价值承诺。这些概念强调了我们自我概念的社会组成部分，并强调了背景社会动态和权力结构在享受和发展自主权方面所发挥的作用。然而，当详细阐述关系自主性的概念时，出现了某些困难，这些困难应该让我们在使用这些概念来制定哲学研究117：143-164，2004的原则时有所停顿。2004 Kluwer Academic Publishers.在荷兰印刷。
Philosophical suspicion of the normative presuppositions of liberalism have often focused on the alleged hyper-individualism of the conception of autonomy and the autonomous person operating at its center. Communitarians, feminists, theorists of identity politics, and others have claimed in different ways that the model of the autonomous agent upon which liberal principles are built assumes a conception of human identity, value, and commitment which is blind to the embeddedness of our self-conceptions, the fundamentally relational nature of our motivations, and the overall social character of our being. Feminists have been especially vocal in the claim that the idea of autonomy central to liberal politics must be reconfigured so as to be more sensitive to relations of care, interdependence, and mutual support that define our lives and which have traditionally marked the realm of the feminine. 1 Emerging from this discussion is a view of the autonomous person that is structured so as to fully embrace this social concep-tion of the self." Relational autonomy" is the label that has been given to an alternative conception of what it means to be a free, self-governing agent who is also socially constituted and who possibly defines her basic value commitments in terms of inter-personal relations and mutual dependencies. 2 Relational views of the autonomous person, then, valuably underscore the social embeddedness of selves while not forsaking the basic value commit-ments of (for the most part, liberal) justice. These conceptions underscore the social components of our self-concepts as well as emphasize the role that background social dynamics and power structures play in the enjoyment and development of autonomy. However, when conceptions of relational autonomy are spelled out in detail, certain difficulties arise which should give us some pause in the utilization of such notions in the formulation of principles of a Philosophical Studies 117: 143-164, 2004.? 2004 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.