Inducing Corporate Social Responsibility: Should Investors Reward the Responsible or Punish the Irresponsible?

Inducing Corporate Social Responsibility: Should Investors Reward the Responsible or Punish the Irresponsible?
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引发企业社会责任:投资者应该奖励负责任的人还是惩罚不负责任的人?

DOI:
10.1007/s10551-020-04669-0
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发表时间:
2020
影响因子:
6.1
通讯作者:
Jason J. Lepore
Jason J. Lepore
中科院分区:
管理学2区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Tyson B. Mackey;Alison Mackey;L. Christensen;Jason J. Lepore

文献摘要

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具有亲社会或可持续发展议程的投资者越来越多地试图通过积极/奖励策略或消极/惩罚策略来影响公司管理者采取对社会负责的行为。本文考虑投资者如何使用每种方法来差异化地影响管理者进行更多的企业社会责任投资。本文使用博弈论与全薪竞赛结构的模型,一个大的机构投资者可以通过创建一个社会责任的投资基金(奖励竞赛)或惩罚公司通过股东积极性(惩罚竞赛)的企业社会责任活动的奖励。我们确定的条件下,惩罚竞赛诱导更高水平的企业社会责任活动相比,奖励竞赛。管理者承担着来自行动主义的大量私人成本就是这样一个条件。溢出效应被认为是经济中的其他管理者参与企业社会责任,以避免受到投资者积极行动的惩罚。当使用奖励时,这种参与程度并不是这样的-只有那些期望获得奖励的经理才会在这种情况下增加他们的CSR活动。这表明,例如,纳入阈值或等级(例如金,银和铜级获奖者)可以增加奖励竞赛的有效性。设计积极和消极的企业社会责任诱因的影响进行了探讨。我们还确定了与这种影响力的尝试有关的伦理困境。
Investors with a pro-social or sustainability agenda increasingly attempt to influence firm managers to adopt socially responsible behavior, either through positive/reward tactics or negative/punishment tactics. This paper considers how investors can use each approach to differentially influence managers to make more CSR investments. The paper uses game theory with an all-pay contest structure to model how a large institutional investor could reward firms for CSR activities by creating a socially responsible investment fund (reward contest) or punish firms via shareholder activism (punishment contest). We identify conditions under which the punishment contest induces a higher level of CSR activity among firms compared to the reward contest. Managers bearing substantial private costs stemming from the activism is one such condition. Spillover effects are seen as the other managers in the economy engage in CSR to avoid being punished by the investor’s activism. This level of engagement is not the case when rewards are used—only those managers with an expectation of being rewarded increase their CSR activity in that scenario. This suggests, for example, that incorporating thresholds or tiers (e.g. gold, silver, and bronze-level winners) can increase the effectiveness of reward contests. Implications for designing both positive and negative CSR inducements are explored. We also identify the ethical dilemmas that relate to such influence attempts.