Some implications of environmental regulation on social welfare under learning-by-doing of eco-products
Some implications of environmental regulation on social welfare under learning-by-doing of eco-products
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DOI：
10.1007/s10018-015-0140-3
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发表时间：
2017
影响因子：
1.7
通讯作者：
Koji Kotani;M. Kakinaka
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Koji Kotani;M. Kakinaka
本文探讨了环境管制的重要性，在一个经济中，由一个单一的生产者提供的生态产品是从传统的产品产生负外部性的区别。我们建立了两类模型：一类是静态的无学习效应的生态产品规划模型，另一类是动态的有学习效应的生态产品规划模型。我们证明了在静态环境下，当生态产品生产的边际成本足够高时，应该采取管制。然而，在动态模型中，管制是否改善社会福利不仅取决于当前的边际成本的生态产品，而且还取决于动态学习效果的程度。特别是当学习效应足够大或足够小时，管制会提高社会福利，而当学习效应足够大或足够小时，管制会降低社会福利。 虽然直觉告诉我们，该规则的值似乎是单调增加的学习效果，我们的研究结果表明，该值具有非单调的U形特征的学习效果。动态环境下的最优调控决策可以与静态环境下的最优调控决策匡威，这为学习潜能的研究提供了重要的政策启示。
This paper examines the significance of environmental regulation in an economy where an eco-product supplied by a single producer is differentiated from a conventional product generating negative externalities. We develop two types of the model: one is a static model without learning effect of eco-product planning, and the other is a dynamic model with learning effect. We show that the regulation should be adopted when the marginal cost of the eco-product production is high enough in a static setting. In a dynamic model, however, whether the regulation improves social welfare is dependent not only on current marginal costs of the eco-product, but also on the degree of dynamic learning effect. Particularly, the regulation could improve social welfare when learning effect is either small or large enough, while it could deteriorate social welfare in an intermediate case. Although intuitions tell us that the value of the regulation appears to be monotonically increasing in learning effect, our results suggest that the value possesses a nonmonotone U-shaped feature with respect to learning effect. The optimal decision of the regulation in a dynamic setting could be converse to that of a static setting, providing important policy implications of learning potentials.