Consent, Communication, and Abandonment
Consent, Communication, and Abandonment
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同意、沟通和放弃
DOI：
10.1007/s10982-019-09355-5
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发表时间：
2019
影响因子：
0.8
通讯作者：
Dougherty T
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Dougherty T
根据同意的行为观，同意必须在行为中表达出来，才能免除某人的义务。相比之下，同意的心理观点是，规范有效的同意完全是心理上的。在之前的工作中，我捍卫了行为观的一个版本，根据该观点，规范有效的“同意总是需要公共行为，并且在高风险同意的情况下，这种行为必须采取沟通的形式”。在这篇文章中，我回应了心理观支持者的两个论点。首先，拉里·亚历山大、海蒂·赫德和彼得·韦斯滕认为我的观点对不同行为者的罪责有错误的暗示。我反驳说，我的观点版本没有这些含义，因为它让我们可以自由地对涉及非自愿行为的不同犯罪行为进行道德和法律区分。其次，拉里·亚历山大（Larry Alexander）和金伯利·费赞（Kimberly Ferzan）主张将同意与放弃进行类比：基于放弃的规范性权力取决于一个人的意愿，亚历山大和费赞得出结论，同意也是如此。我反驳说，遗弃需要行为，并对财产伦理可以教会我们很多有关同意性行为的伦理的假设提出质疑。
According to the Behavioral View of consent, consent must be expressed in behavior in order to release someone from a duty. By contrast, the Mental View of consent is that normatively efficacious consent is entirely mental. In previous work, I defended a version of the Behavioral View, according to which normatively efficacious ‘consent always requires public behavior, and this behavior must take the form of communication in the case of high-stakes consent’. In this essay, I respond to two arguments by proponents of the Mental View. First, Larry Alexander, Heidi Hurd and Peter Westen have argued that my view has mistaken implications concerning the culpability of different actors. I counter that my version of the view does not have these implications, as it leaves us free to draw moral and legal distinctions between different offences involving non-consensual behavior. Second, Larry Alexander and Kimberly Ferzan have argued for an analogy between consent and abandonment: on the grounds that the normative power to abandon resides in one’s will, Alexander and Ferzan concludes consent does too. I counter that abandonment requires behavior, and call into question the assumption that the ethics of property have much to teach us about the ethics of sexual consent.