Informative advertising in a distribution channel
Informative advertising in a distribution channel
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DOI：
10.1016/j.ejor.2018.10.042
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发表时间：
2019-04
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Hongyang Shi;Yunchuan Liu;N. Petruzzi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Hongyang Shi;Yunchuan Liu;N. Petruzzi
在本文中，我们研究了当消费者面对产品匹配和零售价格的不确定性时，渠道结构（分散与集中）和产品广告权的指定分配如何影响最终的广告内容和利润，并且在购买之前必须产生沉没成本。我们开发了一个博弈论框架，其中制造商和零售商分别被定义为领导者和追随者，以模拟战略互动以及渠道成员的最佳广告和定价决策。在此背景下，我们发现频道去中心化可能会导致更多的广告内容。此外，我们发现，如果制造商在零售商的产品广告权之外还拥有产品广告权，那么产品广告规定和价格广告规定都可以更大。这种额外的产品广告授权可以导致制造商的利润更高，但零售商的利润更低，整体渠道利润增加。但是，如果制造商拥有独家产品广告权，与两个渠道成员都可以广告产品的情况相比，制造商的独家产品广告权可能导致产品广告规定减少，同时价格广告规定减少；它甚至可能损害制造商，而使零售商受益。我们还发现，将独家产品广告权从零售商转移到制造商导致产品广告条款，从而使更多的消费者访问商店并购买产品，这在很大的参数范围内有利于整个渠道。
In this paper, we study how channel structure (decentralized vs centralized) and specified allocation of product advertising authority affect final advertising content and profits when consumers face uncertainty about both product match and retail price, and must incur a sunk cost to visit the retail store before making a purchase. We develop a game-theoretic framework in which a manufacturer and a retailer are defined as leader and follower, respectively, to model the strategic interactions and the optimal advertising and pricing decisions of channel members. In this context, we find that channel decentralization may lead to greater advertising content. Moreover, we find that if the manufacturer has product advertising authority additional to the retailer’s product advertising authority, then both the product advertising provision and the price advertising provision can be greater. This additional product advertising authority can lead to the manufacturer’s higher but the retailer’s lower profit with increased overall channel profits. However, if the manufacturer has exclusive product advertising authority, as compared to the case in which both channel members can advertise product, the manufacturer’s exclusive product advertising authority can lead to a decreased product advertising provision as well as a decreased price advertising provision; and it may even hurt the manufacturer while benefiting the retailer. We also find that a shift of exclusive product advertising authority from the retailer to the manufacturer leads to a product advertising provision that is such that more consumers will visit the store and purchase the product, which benefits the overall channel for a large parameter range.