Axiomatization of a Preference for Most Probable Winner
Axiomatization of a Preference for Most Probable Winner
复制标题
最可能获胜者偏好的公理化
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.664441
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发表时间：
2005
影响因子：
0.8
通讯作者：
Pavlo R. Blavatskyy
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Pavlo R. Blavatskyy
在离散结果彩票的二元选择中，当L1产生比L2更好结果的概率高于L2产生比L1更好结果的概率时，个体可能更喜欢彩票L1而不是彩票L2。这种偏好可以通过三个标准公理（可解性、凸性和对称性）和一个不那么标准的公理（扇入）来合理化。对最可能赢家的偏好可以用一个偏对称双线性效用函数来表示。这样的效用函数具有后悔理论的结构，当彩票结果被认为是有序的，并且后悔厌恶的假设被对获胜的偏好所取代。讨论了支持所提出的公理系统的经验证据。
In binary choice between discrete outcome lotteries, an individual may prefer lottery L1 to lottery L2 when the probability that L1 delivers a better outcome than L2 is higher than the probability that L2 delivers a better outcome than L1. Such a preference can be rationalized by three standard axioms (solvability, convexity and symmetry) and one less standard axiom (a fanning-in). A preference for the most probable winner can be represented by a skew-symmetric bilinear utility function. Such a utility function has the structure of a regret theory when lottery outcomes are perceived as ordinal and the assumption of regret aversion is replaced with a preference for a win. The empirical evidence supporting the proposed system of axioms is discussed.