Antitrust in the Not‐for‐Profit Sector
Antitrust in the Not‐for‐Profit Sector
复制标题
非营利部门的反垄断
DOI：
10.1086/589704
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发表时间：
2006
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
R. Posner
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
T. Philipson;R. Posner
虽然非营利部门对许多行业的总产出贡献很大，但对在该部门实施反垄断政策的经济后果几乎没有明确的分析。尽管在传统的经济分析中强调营利性和非营利性公司之间的差异，但美国反垄断法通常不区分这两种组织形式。本文认为，在合理的假设和可能的例外情况下，非营利部门和营利部门存在相同的限制贸易的动机。利他主义的公司从利用市场支配力中获益，即使它们在没有竞争的情况下定价低于成本。事实上，反垄断政策带来的效率收益对非营利公司来说可能更大。因此，即使生产者的动机是利他的，促进竞争的政策也具有社会价值。对这两个部门实行统一的反托拉斯待遇的论点也延伸到了反托拉斯法的豁免。
Although the not‐for‐profit sector contributes greatly to aggregate output in many industries, there has been little explicit analysis of the economic consequences of applying antitrust policy in this sector. Despite the differences between for‐profit and nonprofit firms stressed in conventional economic analyses, U.S. antitrust law generally does not distinguish between these two organizational forms. This paper argues that, under plausible assumptions and with possible exceptions, the same incentives to restrain trade exist in the nonprofit sector as in the for‐profit sector. Altruistic firms benefit from exploiting market power, even when they would price below cost in the absence of competition. In fact, the efficiency gains from antitrust policy may often be larger for nonprofit firms. Therefore, a policy of promoting competition has social value even when producers’ motivations are altruistic. The argument for uniform antitrust treatment of the two sectors extends to exemptions from antitrust law as well.