About farmers’ bargaining power within the new CAP
About farmers’ bargaining power within the new CAP
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关于新 CAP 中农民的议价能力
DOI：
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发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
European Commission
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
B. Velazquez;B. Buffaria;European Commission
本文考察了旨在重新平衡食物链中不平等市场力量的工具的当前设置。对农民和农民组织的横向一体化可能性给予了特别关注，因为这是对《共同市场组织条例(欧盟)1308/2013号条例》(CMO条例)所载竞争政策的克减。首先，我们建议回顾关于食物链上不完全的价格传导的文献。其次，我们考察了旨在抵消产业链上市场不平等的工具的CAP是如何随着时间的推移发挥作用的，特别是如果它们有助于提高效率、农民收入和消费者福利的话。第三，我们评估了CMO法规的当前设置，特别是定义了对竞争政策的克减的方式(排除，例如生产者组织)。这里的主要研究问题是，目前的环境是否允许实现加强生产者讨价还价能力的目标，同时避免创造垄断力量。我们的研究强调，对规模与盈利能力或效率之间的关系的研究出现了不同的结果，并有显著的规模经济证据。更大的PO不仅会更有利可图，而且他们还可以为其成员提供更多服务，特别是当这些服务与巨大的投资成本相关时。关于旨在改善食品供应链运作的政策措施，CMO条例依赖生产者组织作为生产者合作的主要工具。但是，新的立法环境可能会导致矛盾的后果，即通过挑战POS的存在和/或创建来阻碍其运作。
This paper examines the current setting of instruments aimed at rebalancing unequal market power in the food chain. Particular attention is given to horizontal integration possibilities for farmers, and organisations of farmers, as derogations to competition policies contained in the Common Market Organisation Regulation (EU) 1308/2013 (CMO Regulation). Firstly, we propose a review of the literature that looks at the imperfect price transmission along the food chain. Secondly, we examine how CAP of instruments aimed at counterbalancing market inequalities along the chain have been functioning over time, notably if they contributed to improving efficiency, farmers’ income and consumers’ welfare. Thirdly, we assess the current setting of the CMO Regulation, in particular, the way derogations to the competition policy are defined (exclusions, e.g. producer’s organisations). The main research question here is if the current setting does, or does not, allow attaining the objective of strengthening the bargaining power of producers, while at the same time avoiding the creation of monopoly power. Our research highlights that divergent results emerged from studies on the relation between size and profitability or efficiency, with evidence of significant economies of scale. Larger PO not only would be more profitable, but they also may offer more services to their members, especially when these services are associated with significant investment costs. In relation to policy measures aimed at improving the functioning of the food supply chain, the CMO Regulation relies on producer’s organisations as the main vehicle for producer cooperation. But the new legislative setting could lead to the paradoxical consequence of impeding the functioning by challenging the existence and/or creation of POs.