The Walrasian Tâtonnement Mechanism and Information
The Walrasian Tâtonnement Mechanism and Information
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瓦尔拉斯 Tâtonnement 机制和信息
DOI：
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发表时间：
1984
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影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Patrick Joyce
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Patrick Joyce
本文报道了对Walrasian变位机构进行分析的实验结果。吨位机制有以下特点：任何时候只有一个价格；有一个通知所有贸易商价格的信息机制；有一个机制来确定按价格出售和购买的数量；禁止以不平衡的价格进行交易。此外，拍卖人还使用瓦尔拉斯定价规则：价格的变化与超额需求具有相同的符号。实验设计中使用的处理变量是买方和卖方的分离程度。完全隔离意味着卖家无法发现买家的数量，买家无法以公布的价格发现卖家的数量。结果表明，该拍卖机制是稳定的：它具有很强的收敛特性，效率水平平均优于97%。买家和卖家的分离导致需求相对于供给的信息披露不足的显著差异。
This article reports the results of experiments analyzing the Walrasian tâtonnement mechanism. The tâtonnement mechanism has the following characteristics: there is only one price at any time; there is an information mechanism notifying all traders of the price; there is a mechanism for determining quantities offered for sale and purchase at the price; and transactions at nonequilibrating prices are forbidden. In addition, the Walrasian pricing rule is utilized by the auctioneer: the change in price has the same sign as excess demand. The treatment variable used in the experimental design is the degree of segregation of buyers and sellers. Complete segregation means sellers cannot discover the number of buyers and buyers cannot discover the number of sellers at an announced price. The results show that the auction mechanism is stable: it exhibits strong convergence properties and efficiency levels averaging better than 97%. Segregation of the buyers from the sellers leads to a significant difference in underrevelation of demand relative to supply.