Rapid responding increases belief bias: Evidence for the dual-process theory of reasoning

Rapid responding increases belief bias: Evidence for the dual-process theory of reasoning
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DOI:
10.1080/13546780542000005
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发表时间:
2005-11-01
影响因子:
2.6
通讯作者:
Curtis-Holmes, J
Curtis-Holmes, J
中科院分区:
心理学3区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Evans, JSBT;Curtis-Holmes, J

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在这项研究中,我们考察了在标准陈述和被试被要求在10秒内做出反应的条件下,三段论推理中的信念偏差效应。正如预测的那样,快速反应的要求增加了任务中观察到的信念偏差的数量,减少了逻辑正确的决策数量,这两种影响都是实质性的,并且具有统计学意义。这些发现是由推理的双过程解释预测的,该解释认为,导致信念偏差的快速启发式过程与可以导致正确逻辑决策的较慢分析过程竞争。因此,要求快速反应会不同程度地抑制分析推理过程的运作,从而导致观察到的结果。
In this study, we examine the belief bias effect in syllogistic reasoning under both standard presentation and in a condition where participants are required to respond within 10 seconds. As predicted, the requirement for rapid responding increased the amount of belief bias observed on the task and reduced the number of logically correct decisions, both effects being substantial and statistically significant. These findings were predicted by the dual-process account of reasoning, which posits that fast heuristic processes, responsible for belief bias, compete with slower analytic processes that can lead to correct logical decisions. Requiring rapid responding thus differentially inhibits the operation of analytic reasoning processes, leading to the results observed.