Strategic Delegation in Asymmetric Tax Competition
Strategic Delegation in Asymmetric Tax Competition
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DOI：
10.1111/ecpo.12092
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发表时间：
2017-07
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Hikaru Ogawa;Taiki Susa
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Hikaru Ogawa;Taiki Susa
本研究探讨代议制民主制度下的不对称税收竞争。研究结果表明，国家之间的不对称程度影响了每个国家的选举结果，公民选择决策者为该国设定税率。特别是，在某些条件下，选举中的决定性选民可以选择一个公民，其国家资本的份额高于决定性选民自己的份额。
This study examines asymmetric tax competition under representative democracy systems. The findings show that the degree of asymmetry between countries affects the result of elections in each country, where the citizens select a policy-maker to set a tax rate for the country. In particular, under certain conditions, a decisive voter in the election can select a citizen whose share of the country's capital is higher than the decisive voter's own share.