A Theory of Partnership Dynamics
A Theory of Partnership Dynamics
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伙伴关系动力学理论
DOI：
10.1006/game.1996.0007
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发表时间：
1996
影响因子：
1.1
通讯作者：
David Roth
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
David Roth
摘要本文通过一个学习和内生性解散的无限期动态博弈模型，探讨了潜在合伙解散的利弊。随着合伙人了解到他们的伙伴关系相对于外部机会的质量，与伙伴关系相关的租金发生了变化，从而影响了提供努力的激励强度的相关变化。温和的超模块化条件导致的努力水平的最佳均衡上升的预期质量的伙伴关系。经济文献分类号：C72、C73、L14。
Abstract This paper explores the benefits and drawbacks of potential partnership dissolution through an infinite-period, dynamic game-theoretic model of learning and endogenous dissolution. As partners learn about the quality of their partnership relative to their outside opportunities, the rents associated with the partnership change, effecting a related change in the strength of incentives to provide effort. Mild supermodularity conditions lead to effort levels in the optimal equilibria which rise in the expected quality of the partnership. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C73, L14.