Systematicity : An Overview
Systematicity : An Overview
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系统性:概述
DOI:
10.7551/mitpress/9559.003.0003
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发表时间:
2013
期刊:
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
P. Calvo
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
J. Symons;P. Calvo
In 1988 Jerry Fodor and Zenon Pylyshyn published “Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture: A Critical Analysis.” Their article presented a forceful and highly influential criticism of the explanatory relevance of neural network models of cognition. At the time, connectionism was reemerging as a popular and exciting new field of research, but according to Fodor and Pylyshyn, the approach rested on a flawed model of the human mind. Connectionism is the view that the mind can be understood in terms of an interconnected network of simple mechanisms. Its proponents contend that cognitive and behavioral properties can be modeled and explained in terms of their emergence from the collective behavior of simple interacting and adaptive mechanisms. According to Fodor and Pylyshyn, connectionist approaches neglect an essential feature of thought – its systematic nature. On their view, the basic psychological fact that thoughts are intrinsically related to some other thoughts in systematic ways becomes inexplicable if one denies that representations are structured in a syntactically and semantically classical combinatorial manner. 1 Connectionism, they argued, inevitably fails to provide a meaningful explanation of cognition insofar as it confuses the intrinsically systematic nature of thought with a system of associations. 2 Connectionism might shed some light on the way that cognitive architectures happen to be implemented in brains, but the explanation of cognition does not take place at the level of biology or hardware. A cognitive architecture must be systematic to the core in order to shed light on the intrinsically systematic character of cognition. One prominent message of their article, that a cognitive architecture must explain systematicity in order to explain human cognition, came to be called the systematicity challenge.