Core-Periphery Segregation in Evolving Prisoner’s Dilemma Networks
Core-Periphery Segregation in Evolving Prisoner’s Dilemma Networks
复制标题
不断发展的囚徒困境网络中的核心-外围隔离
DOI：
10.1093/comnet/cnz021
复制
发表时间：
2020
影响因子：
2.1
通讯作者：
T.K. Ahn
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Yunkyu Sohn;Jung-Kyoo Choi;T.K. Ahn
密集的合作网络是繁荣社会的社会资本的重要组成部分。这些网络使个人能够通过增强信任来克服集体行动的困境。在许多生物和社会环境中，网络结构随着主体退出关系并建立新关系而内生演化。然而，博弈策略和交互结构之间的相互作用（通过进化动力学导致密集合作网络的自组织）尚未被理解。我们对退出和合作伙伴选择选项的囚徒困境实验表明，合作者和叛逃者的核心与边缘隔离推动了合作的出现。合作者的“以牙还牙”和叛逃者的“游走”策略导致核心与边缘结构高度不对称。合作者在核心上相互联系紧密，成功地隔离了外围的叛逃者，并获得了更大的回报。
Dense cooperative networks are an essential element of social capital for prosperous societies. These networks enable individuals to overcome collective action dilemmas by enhancing trust. In many biological and social settings, network structures evolve endogenously as agents exit relationships and build new ones. However, the interplay between game strategy and interaction structure by which evolutionary dynamics leads to self-organization of dense cooperative networks has not been understood. Our prisoner’s dilemma experiments with exit and partner choice options show that core–periphery segregation of cooperators and defectors drives the emergence of cooperation. Cooperators’ Quit-for-Tat and defectors’ Roving strategy lead to a highly asymmetric core and periphery structure. Densely connected to each other at the core, cooperators successfully isolate defectors at the periphery and earn larger payoffs.