Term Limitation in a Dynamic Model of Partisan Balance
Term Limitation in a Dynamic Model of Partisan Balance
复制标题
党派平衡动态模型中的任期限制
DOI：
10.1007/978-94-009-1812-2_10
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发表时间：
1994
影响因子：
4.2
通讯作者：
Paul Rothstein
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
John Gilmour;Paul Rothstein
1992年11月，14个州的选民投票决定是否限制国会议员的任期。所有14项提案都获得了通过（其中10项获得了超过60%的支持），使有国会任期限制的州总数达到了15个。许多关于任期限制的讨论都集中在代表性问题上，政党的力量，以及采用限制后国会的运作（Benjamin和Malbin， 1992）， （Will, 1992）。本文探讨了任期限制的一个重要但很少被讨论的后果，即它对立法机构党派平衡的影响。我们探讨选举动态、在职优势和自愿退休如何与任期限制相互作用，从而在两党立法机构中产生政党之间的新平衡。哪一方赞成引入任期限制？任期的长短有什么关系？是否存在这样的条件，即一方将受到任何限制的青睐，无论限制有多严格？
In November 1992, voters in fourteen states considered ballot propositions to adopt term limits for members of Congress. All fourteen propositions passed (ten received more than 60% support), bringing the total number of states with congressional term limits to fifteen. Much of the discussion of term limitation has focused on issues of representation, the strength of parties, and the functioning of Congress after the adoption of limits (Benjamin and Malbin, 1992), (Will, 1992). This paper explores an important but less discussed consequence of term limitation, its impact on the partisan balance of legislatures. We inquire how electoral dynamics, incumbent advantage, and voluntary retirement interact with a term limit to produce a new balance between parties in a two-party legislature. Which party is favored by the introduction of term limits? How does the length of the term limit matter? Are there conditions such that one party will be favored by any limit, regardless of how restrictive?