BACK TO THE FUTURE OF DISSONANCE THEORY: COGNITIVE CONSISTENCY AS A CORE MOTIVE
BACK TO THE FUTURE OF DISSONANCE THEORY: COGNITIVE CONSISTENCY AS A CORE MOTIVE
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DOI：
10.1521/soco.2012.30.6.652
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发表时间：
2012-12-01
期刊：
影响因子：
1.9
通讯作者：
Gawronski, Bertram
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Gawronski, Bertram
在他的认知失调理论中，Festinger（1957）将认知一致性描述为一种心理需求，就像饥饿和口渴一样基本。然而，在过去的几十年里，认知一致性作为核心动机的想法已经被越来越狭隘的关注所取代，这种关注与不和谐相关的态度变化以及将这种变化归因于自我防御机制的其他解释。当前的文章旨在恢复作为一个核心动机的认知一致性的想法，认为不一致性作为一个认知线索的错误，在一个人的信念系统。由于不一致性通常可以通过多种方式解决，动机性推理可以使不一致性解决过程偏向于期望的结论，尽管动机性扭曲受到认知一致性需求的限制。一致性过程的普遍性通过其在各种威胁补偿实例中的作用来说明（例如，受害者减损，自我验证，系统辩护）以及从认知一致性方面重新概念化各种社会心理现象中可以获得的见解（例如，偏见相关的信仰系统，倾向性推理，第一印象的稳定性）。
In his theory of cognitive dissonance, Festinger (1957) described cognitive consistency as a psychological need that is as basic as hunger and thirst. Over the past decades, however, the idea of cognitive consistency as a core motive has been replaced by an increasingly narrow focus on dissonance-related changes in attitudes and alternative accounts that attribute such changes to mechanisms of ego-defense. The current article aims at reviving the idea of cognitive consistency as a core motive, arguing that inconsistency serves as an epistemic cue for errors in one's system of beliefs. Because inconsistency can often be resolved in multiple ways, motivated reasoning can bias processes of inconsistency resolution toward desired conclusions, although motivated distortions are constrained by the need for cognitive consistency. The ubiquity of consistency processes is illustrated through its role in various instances of threat-compensation (e.g., victim derogation, self-verification, system justification) and the insights that can be gained from reconceptualizing various social psychological phenomena in terms of cognitive consistency (e.g., prejudice-related belief systems, dispositional inference, stability of first impressions).