The Cost of Diversity: The Diversification Discount and Inefficient Investment

The Cost of Diversity: The Diversification Discount and Inefficient Investment
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DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.56108
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发表时间:
1998-01
期刊:
S&P Global Market Intelligence Research Paper Series
影响因子:
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通讯作者:
R. Rajan;H. Servaes;Luigi Zingales
R. Rajan;H. Servaes;Luigi Zingales
中科院分区:
其他
文献类型:
--
作者:
R. Rajan;H. Servaes;Luigi Zingales

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我们对内部权力斗争在多元化公司各部门之间的资源分配中可能产生的扭曲进行了建模。该模型预测,如果部门的资源和机会水平相似,资金将从机会较差的部门转移到机会良好的部门。然而,当资源和机会的多样性增加时,资源可能会流向效率最低的部门,导致投资效率更高、企业价值更低。我们在 1980 年至 1993 年期间对一组多元化的美国公司测试了这些预测,并找到了与这些预测一致的证据。公司理论中的基本问题,由科斯于 1937 年提出! 60 多年前,这就是层级内部做出的决策与市场中做出的决策的不同之处。科斯认为,等级制度内的决策是由权力考虑而不是相对价格决定的。如果情况确实如此,为什么以及何时,等级制度主导了市场?该领域取得进展的一个主要障碍是缺乏数据。公司内部决策的数据通常是专有的。即使研究人员可以使用它们,也很难在市场上找到一组可比较的决策。一个值得注意的例外是多元化公司的资本配置决策。自 1978 年以来,美国上市公司被迫披露主要业务部门的销售、盈利和投资数据!对多部门公司的小样本的分析表明,部门大体上对应于不同的内部部门。
We model the distortions that internal power struggles can generate in the allocation of resources between divisions of a diversified firm. The model predicts that if divisions are similar in the level of their resources and opportunities, funds will be transferred from divisions with poor opportunities to divisions with good opportunities. When diversity in resources and opportunities increases, however, resources can f low toward the most inefficient division, leading to more inefficient investment and less valuable firms. We test these predictions on a panel of diversified U.S. firms during the period from 1980 to 1993 and find evidence consistent with them. THE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION IN THE THEORY of the firm, raised by Coase ~1937! more than 60 years ago, is how decisions taken inside a hierarchy differ from those taken in the marketplace. Coase suggested that decisions within a hierarchy are determined by power considerations rather than relative prices. If this is indeed the case, why, and when, does the hierarchy dominate the market? A major obstacle to progress in this area has been the lack of data. Data on internal decisions made by firms are generally proprietary. Even when they are available to researchers, it is difficult to find a comparable group of decisions taken in the market. A notable exception is the capital allocation decision in diversified firms. Since 1978, public U.S. companies have been forced to disclose their data on sales, profitability, and investments by major lines of business ~segments!. An analysis of a small sample of multisegment firms reveals that segments correspond, by and large, to distinct internal