Transplants and Implants: The Economics of Self‐Improvement
Transplants and Implants: The Economics of Self‐Improvement
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移植和植入：自我完善的经济学
DOI：
10.1111/1468-2354.00126
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发表时间：
2001
影响因子：
1.5
通讯作者：
M. Coles
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
K. Burdett;M. Coles
本文考察了具有不可转移效用的双边搜索模型中的均衡、自我改进和求婚策略。单身人士是垂直分化的--一些人比其他人更适合做婚姻伴侣。给出了平衡点的完整刻画。研究表明，自我改进决策有两个外部性。此外，这些外部性可能支持多个帕累托可排名均衡。通过鼓励每个人自我提高，社会可以创造一种每个人都被迫提高以保持“可接受”的局面。但在自我改进较少(成本较低)的情况下，可能存在一种更好的均衡。
This article examines equilibrium self-improvement and marriage proposal strategies in a two-sided search model with nontransferable utility. Singles are vertically differentiated--some make better marriage partners than others. A complete characterization of equilibrium is provided. It is shown there are two externalities to self-improvement decisions. Further, these externalities may support multiple Pareto rankable equilibria. By encouraging everybody to self-improve, society can create a situation where everybody is forced to improve to remain "acceptable." But a preferred equilibrium may exist where there is less (costly) self-improvement.