Non-cooperative Behavior and Efficient Provision of Public Goods
Non-cooperative Behavior and Efficient Provision of Public Goods
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非合作行为与公共物品的有效供给
DOI：
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发表时间：
1989
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
D. Wildasin
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Robin Boadway;P. Pestieau;D. Wildasin
作者表明，在纯公共物品由私人自愿捐款资助的非合作均衡的基础上，中央机构可以通过对个人捐款的适当补贴选择来诱导有效的解决方案。他们还表明，一个非合作的均衡与积极的贡献是有效的，当且仅当，个人每单位补贴的总和为n - 1，其中n是个人的数量。他们最终建立了一个对应的非合作和林达尔均衡。
The authors show that, on the basis of a noncooperative equilibrium whereby pure public goods are financed by voluntary private contributions, a centralized agency may induce an efficient solution by an appropriate choice of subsidy on the individuals' contributions. They also show that a noncooperative equilibrium with positive contributions is efficient if, and only if, the individual per unit subsidies sum to n - 1, where n is the number of individuals. They finally establish a correspondence between noncooperative and Lindahl equilibria.