Counterfactuals and Modal Epistemology
Counterfactuals and Modal Epistemology
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反事实和模态认识论
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发表时间：
2012
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通讯作者：
Tuomas E. Tahko
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作者：
Tuomas E. Tahko
我们对形而上学模态的认识途径是什么？蒂莫西威廉姆森认为，反事实的认识论将提供答案。本文对威廉姆森的解释提出了质疑，认为威廉姆森所讨论的反事实认识论的某些要素，即所谓的背景知识和构成性事实，已经充满了他的解释所未能解释的模态内容。威廉姆森的帐户将首先概述和背景知识和构成事实的作用进行了分析。他们的关键作用是限制我们的想象力，排除不相关的反事实假设。然而，在我们处理违反实际物理定律的隐喻可能的反事实假设的情况下，背景知识是有问题的。正如我们将看到的，除非威廉姆森假定背景知识与实际的、真正的物理定律相一致，并且这些定律是形而上学上必要的，否则很难解决这个问题。此外，威廉姆森的叙述没有考虑到可想象但在形而上学上不可能的情景与可想象但在形而上学上可能的情景之间的区别。这是因为背景知识和构成性事实是严格建立在我们对现实世界的认识基础上的。威廉姆森确实试图用形而上学的不确定性来解决这个问题--因为它们在所有可能的世界中都成立--但我们会看到，即使在这种情况下，这种解释也是有问题的。这些问题，这将是建议，不能解决的反事实帐户的认识论的情态。本文最后分析了威廉姆森可能的反驳，并对模态认识论的另一种解释的前景进行了讨论。
What is our epistemic access to metaphysical modality? Timothy Williamson suggests that the epistemology of counterfactuals will provide the answer. Th is paper challenges Williamson’s account and argues that certain elements of the epistemology of counterfactuals that he discusses, namely so called background knowledge and constitutive facts, are already saturated with modal content which his account fails to explain. Williamson’s account will fi rst be outlined and the role of background knowledge and constitutive facts analysed. Th eir key role is to restrict our imagination to rule out irrelevant counterfactual suppositions. However, background knowledge turns out to be problematic in cases where we are dealing with metaphysically possible counterfactual suppositions that violate the actual laws of physics. As we will see, unless Williamson assumes that background knowledge corresponds with the actual, true laws of physics and that these laws are metaphysically necessary, it will be diffi cult to address this problem. Furthermore, Williamson’s account fails to accommodate the distinction between conceivable yet metaphysically impossible scenarios, and conceivable and metaphysically possible scenarios. Th is is because background knowledge and constitutive facts are based strictly on our knowledge of the actual world. Williamson does attempt to address this concern with regard to metaphysical necessities—as they hold across all possible worlds—but we will see that even in this case the explanation is questionable. Th ese problems, it will be suggested, cannot be addressed in a counterfactual account of the epistemology of modality. Th e paper fi nishes with an analysis of Williamson’s possible rejoinders and some discussion about the prospects of an alternative account of modal epistemology.