Compatibilism and Free Belief
Compatibilism and Free Belief
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相容性与自由信仰
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发表时间:
2009
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通讯作者:
A. Booth
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作者:
A. Booth
Matthias Steup (Steup 2008) has recently argued that our doxastic attitudes are free by (i) drawing an analogy with compatibilism about freedom of action and (ii) denying that it is a necessary condition for believing at will that S's having an intention to believe that p can cause S to believe that p. In this paper, however, I argue that the strategies espoused in (i) and (ii) are incompatible.